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Abstract 
This paper aims to examine the factors affecting the choice of capital structure for publicly listed firms in 
four Nordic countries including Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden over the period 2004 – 2017. The 
result of the investigation into firm-specific determinants on the capital structure shows that tangibility and 
firm size have a significant positive relationship with long-term debt ratio for public firms in most of Nordic 
countries, except for Finland. On the other hand, profitability is negatively correlated with leverage ratio in 
all four countries; meanwhile, growth opportunity yields a mixed result: there is a significant negative 
relationship for Finnish public firms and a significant positive relationship for Danish public firms. Liquidity 
and Non-debt tax shields have no significant impact on leverage for most of Nordic countries, except for 
Finland in terms of liquidity and Sweden in terms of non-debt tax shields. Business risk shows a significant 
negative relationship with leverage ratio in Norway and Sweden. Moreover, by decomposing the sample set 
into different industrial categories, I find that there is evidence for the existence of industrial effect on firm-
specific determinants, as the impact of those determinants on leverage ratio is different in different sectors. 
The result of the investigation into country-specific effects shows that GDP growth rate and the 
development of the stock market have a significant negative correlation with long-term debt ratio. On the other 
hand, the estimation results show that the development of the banking industry, the development of the bond 
market, and the inflation rate have no significant impact on capital structure decision for public firms in the 
Nordic region. These results may imply that Nordic firms in general prefer equity financing to debt financing, 
and when it comes to debt financing decision these firms prefer corporate bonds to bank loans. 
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1 Introduction 
In the past years, formation of the capital structure and how it could be utilized to maximize 
the value of public firms has been an important research topic that there are several studies 
by economists and researchers to examine the impact of different factors on the capital 
structure. On the one hand, public firms theoretically could take advantage of tax shields 
from debt repayment to maximize their value. On the other hand, public firms, however, 
could find it difficult to service their debt obligation if the adopted level of debt is too high. 
High level of debt could also bring along a higher risk of bankruptcy and also different types 
of financial distress. Therefore, from the point of view of the static trade-off theory, public 
firms always strive to balance the benefits and the costs of debts, and seek to the optimal 
capital structure formation to maximize their value. However, from the point of view of the 
pecking order theory, unlike what static trade-off theory suggested, in general public firms 
are more likely to prefer internal financing to external financing, and in case of external 
financing, firms may seek to the safest security first, which includes convertible bonds, 
different types of debts. According to the theory, equity issues are considered as a last resort 
when it comes to financing decision made by public firms. Both theories were developed 
based on the theoretical foundation of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) propositions which 
argued that the value of public firms is unaffected by the choice of capital structure.  
Existing literature for a long time has studied the impacts of different determinants on 
the capital structure of public firms in several countries and regions. Although most of the 
studies used Modigliani and Miller theorem, static trade-off theory, pecking order theory 
and agency cost as their theoretical foundation, these studies, however, often yielded a mixed 
result about the impacts of determinants on the capital structure. One of the reasons for the 
inconsistent results may be because different authors adopted different measurement and 
regression method in their research. Another explanation may be because for different 
countries, the impact of determinants on capital structure is different due to the existence of 
country effect and industrial effect. The impact of these two factors will be further discussed 
in this paper.  
On the other hand, while these studies mostly focused on investigating the impacts of 
different determinants on the capital structure of public firms in the United States and in 
other developed European countries, it is quite uncommon to see any papers examining those 
impacts exclusively in the Nordic region. Therefore, this paper is not only to provide a closer 
look on this topic for four Nordic countries, but also can be treated as a reference for 
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comparative analysis of the impacts of determinants on capital structure between the region 
and the United States, or common developed European countries.  
1.1 Purpose and Scope of this Paper 
The purpose of this study is to investigate how different factors, at both firm-level and 
country-level, have their impacts on the choice of capital structure for publicly listed firms 
in four Nordic countries including Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden over the period 
from 2004 to 2017. The study aims to answer the following research questions:  
 How do firm-specific determinants affect the capital structure choice of public listed 
firms in the Nordic region? 
 Is there any industrial effect on the firm-specific determinants in the Nordic region? Or 
in another words, is there any difference in the effect of firm-specific determinants across 
industries in the Nordic region? 
 Is there any effect of financial crisis in 2008 on the firm-specific determinants of capital 
structure? 
 How do country-specific determinants affect the capital structure choice of firms in the 
Nordic region? 
This paper examines public listed firms in four Nordic countries including Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden over the period of 14 years 2004 – 2017. Data sample is, on 
the one hand, further divided into different industrial sectors to examine the industrial effect, 
and on the other hand divided into pre-crisis and post-crisis period to examine the crisis 
effect on determinants of capital structure. 
1.2 Contribution of this Paper 
Although there have been a lot of studies on determinants of capital structure, most of them 
focus on American and common European countries, while only few studies have been made 
to examine the choice of capital structure in the Nordic region. Therefore, this paper 
contributes to examines the effect of both firm-specific and country-specific determinants 
on the debt ratio for public listed firms in four Nordic countries. In addition to 
macroeconomic effects, this paper also examines the effect of industrial classification and 
financial crisis in 2008 on the choice of capital structure for public firms in the Nordic region.  
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1.3 Limitation of this Paper 
Due to the choice of selected countries in the data set, as well as the choice of selected 
industrial sectors, this paper possesses following limitation.  
The first limitation is that the proximity in geographical location as well as the similarity in 
macroeconomic factors lead to the exclusion of commonly adopted independent variables 
such as corruption and legal system dummy variable. These exclusions may lead to a 
significant difference in the relationship of independent variables in comparison to prior 
existing literature.  
The second limitation is that this study from the beginning has excluded financial firms from 
the final sample set as I find that these financial firms have a distinct capital structure 
behavior due to their liquidity characteristic. This exclusion may yield a different estimation 
result in comparison to the sample set which fully includes financial firms. However, for 
these financial firms, separate analysis should be conducted and afterward compared to firms 
operating in other sector to gain a more thorough understanding of the determinants of 
capital structure. 
1.4 Structure of this Paper 
This paper is divided into six main sections. After this introduction section, the second 
section aims to introduce some important theoretical background relating to capital structure 
and relevant existing empirical studies on determinants of capital structure. The third section 
aims to provide an overview of the methodology to be used in this study. The fourth section 
provides a detail introduction to the data and sample set, as well as all the firm-specific and 
country-specific determinants of capital structure and hypotheses. The fifth section provides 
estimation results and the last section provides the conclusion of the study.  
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2 Literature review 
2.1 Theoretical Background 
The first part of this section provides an overview on all of the notable theories related to the 
capital structure, which include Modigliani and Miller (1958), the pecking order theory 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984), the static trade-off theory, and the agency cost (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
2.1.1 Modigliani and Miller Propositions 
In most of the existing empirical studies on the topic of the capital structure, Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) is frequently referred as the pioneer on this research area. Theoretically, their 
theory was developed based on a set of assumptions, including perfect market condition with 
symmetries of information, no taxes, no transaction costs, no risk of default and no 
bankruptcy costs. The theory suggests that the choice of capital structure has no impact on 
the market value of firms, as firms and outside investors could equally access to the financial 
market due to the symmetries of information and no restriction on taxes as well as transaction 
costs. However, because of these assumptions, the theory is considered to be irrelevant in 
the real-world context, as most of the assumptions are not applicable in practice. 
2.1.2 The Static Trade-off Theory 
With Modigliani and Miller propositions as a foundation, the static trade-off theory further 
explains the choice of companies on their capital structure. The theory implies that firms are 
always making trade-off decision to balance between the benefits of debt financing and the 
costs of financial distress and bankruptcy risk due to the high level of leverage, and therefore, 
the optimal capital structure could be achieved when these firms balance between the 
benefits and the costs of debts. 
The theory takes into consideration the tax deductible on debt’s payment as a reliable 
method to lower firms’ weighted average cost of capital by obtaining more debt over equity. 
However, as the portion of debt becomes higher, firms also face a higher probability of 
failure to pay for their debt’s obligation and other types of financial distress. Furthermore, 
from the lender’s perspective, they are more likely to require a higher cost of debt to 
compensate for the increase in lending risk as the debt ratio of the borrowing company 
getting higher. As a result, the benefits of debt will be offset by the increase in cost of debts.  
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However, the static trade-off theory is not fully supported by empirical evidences from 
prior studies. Myers (1993) found the inverse correlation between profitability and firm’s 
leverage in the US market, while Titman and Wessels (1988) also found a significant 
negative relationship between profitability and leverage ratio for public firms. One of the 
reasons for the irrelevance of the static trade-off theory is that in reality, tax shield benefit 
derived from deductible interest payments is large and certain, meanwhile the costs of 
financial distress are uncertain and less important for public firms.  
2.1.3 The Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory by Myers and Majluf (1984) provides a preference order when it 
comes to financing decision for companies, whether it is internal financing or external 
financing through debt and equity issues. The theory takes into account the presence of 
information asymmetry to explain the pecking order: in general public firms are more likely 
to prefer internal financing to external financing, and in case of external financing, firms 
may seek to the safest security first, which includes convertible bonds, different types of 
debts. According to the theory, equity issues are considered as a last resort when it comes to 
financing decision made by public firms. 
Theoretically, because of the presence of information asymmetry, public firms’ 
managers are more likely to have more information and knowledge about their firms, 
including firms’ operation activities and upcoming investment projects, than outside 
investors. Because outside investors most often do not have the comprehensive information 
about the company, they analyze and assess the company’s potential based on a set of signals 
and based on the company’s decision, which also includes equity issue decision. These 
outside investors consider equity issue decision as a bad signal, based on their assumption 
that managers and existing shareholders are never willing to dilute the benefits of their 
existing shares to outside investors, unless there is no potential positive NPV projects. As a 
result, equity issue decision is less favorable to outside investors, which in turn has negative 
impact on the share price (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
On the other hand, public firms could also utilize the information asymmetries to send 
out positive signals to outside investors in a form of bond issues or bank loans decision. 
Because banks are considered to be sophisticated lenders and most often require a strict 
requirement for lending procedure, for outside investors, bank loans announcement from 
public firms is considered as a good signal for the firms’ prospect. In practice, “good” firms 
are more willing to borrow with short maturity because their probability of needing 
Literature review 8  
 
 
additional funding in the short-term is rather low. Thus, these “good” firms may send out 
positive signal to outside investors by borrowing with short maturities, which affects their 
choice of leverage level. 
From the perspective of firms’ managers, they are more discouraged to issue equity to 
finance upcoming potential positive NPV projects, because they are afraid equity issued will 
be undervalued due to the information asymmetry between managers and outside investors. 
Therefore, the theory suggests that firms are more likely to finance their investment 
opportunities with safest security first, which starts from retention and other types of internal 
financing, then debt as the first source of external financing, followed by hybrid securities 
such as convertible bonds and finally equity as the last resort of external financing. The 
theory also helps to explain why managers, for the benefits of existing shareholders, are 
willing to reject potential positive NPV projects if those projects require equity financing. 
2.1.4 The Agency Cost 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency cost as the type of costs occur when corporate 
managers and shareholders attempt to act in their own self-interests and thus there is the 
existence of differences in interest between these two parties. More specifically, the theory 
suggests that there are two types of agency conflicts: one is the conflict between the 
managers and the stakeholders, and another one is the conflict between shareholders and 
debtholders of public firms.  
One of the reasons for the conflict between the managers and the stakeholders is that 
while shareholders’ optimal objective is to maximize their return-on-investment and firm’s 
value, corporate managers may make their decisions not to maximize shareholders’ benefits 
but to maximize their own private benefits. Consequently, such conflict could yield the issue 
of asset substitution or the issue of underinvestment. In the case of asset substitution, 
managers pay more attention to the payoff in the good scenario and pay less attention to the 
magnitude of loss in case of bankruptcy. It leads to the case where these corporate managers 
have an increased incentive to undertake risky projects as debt level increases even when 
those risky projects have negative NPV.  
On the other hand, one of the reasons for the conflict between shareholders and 
debtholders is because of the underinvestment problem. Underinvestment occurs because 
shareholders’ interest is to maximize their return-on-investment, while debtholders’ interest 
is to redeem the fixed amount of debt repayment. Therefore, shareholders are not only more 
willing to accept risky projects in order to maximize their benefits even when these projects 
Literature review 9  
 
 
have negative NPV, but they are also more willing to forego valuable investment 
opportunities if these opportunities transfer the wealth from the shareholders to the 
debtholders and leave insufficient returns to the shareholders. 
2.2 Previous Literature Review 
Existing literature for a long time has studied the impacts of different determinants on the 
capital structure of public firms in several countries and regions. Although most of the 
studies used Modigliani and Miller theorem, static trade-off theory, pecking order theory 
and agency cost as their theoretical foundation, these studies, however, often yielded a mixed 
result about the impacts of determinants on the capital structure. One of the reasons for the 
inconsistent results may be because different authors adopted different measurement and 
regression method in their research. Another explanation may be because for different 
countries, the impact of determinants on capital structure is different due to the existence of 
country effect and industrial effect. The impact of these two factors will be further discussed 
in the following chapters in this paper.  
Rajan and Zingales (1995) in their “What do we know about capital structure? Some 
evidence from international data” published on The Journal of Finance studied the effect of 
firm-specific determinants on the capital structure of public listed firms in the major 
industrialized countries in G7 countries. The study found that there is little difference in the 
leverage ratio between public firms in G7 countries. Moreover, the authors found a 
significant relationship between a set of firm-specific factors and the debt ratio for public 
listed firms. These firm-specific factors include tangibility, profitability and firm size. 
Bancel et al. (2004) in their “Cross-country determinants of capital structure choice: 
a survey of European Firms” published on Financial Management studied the determinants 
of capital structure in 16 European countries. The authors found that although legal 
framework is usually considered as an important factor of debt policy, there is no correlation 
between legal environment and the common stock policy. Furthermore, the paper found that 
public firms determine their capital structure by trading off costs and benefits of financing, 
which is consistent with the static trade-off theory discussed in the earlier section. 
Deesomsak et al. (2004) in their “The determinants of capital structure: evidence from 
the Asia Pacific region” published on Journal of Multinational Financial Management 
studied the effect of both firm-specific and country-specific determinants on the capital 
structure for public listed firms across four countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Australia. Using both fixed effect and ordinary least square regression model, the authors 
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found a positive relationship between firm size and leverage ratio for public firms across 
four countries. On the other hand, growth opportunities, non-debt tax shields as well as 
liquidity have negative association with the debt ratio. More importantly, the paper 
demonstrated the existence of country effect on the determinants of capital structure, as 
different determinants are found to have different impacts on leverage for each country. 
Huang (2006) in his “The determinants of capital structure: Evidence from China” 
published on China Economic Review studied the impact of firm-specific determinants on 
capital structure of more than 1,200 public listed firms in China. The author found a 
significant positive relationship between firm size and leverage ratio, and a significant 
negative correlation between profitability, non-debt tax shields, and growth opportunities 
with the leverage for Chinese public listed firms. 
De Jong et al. (2008) in their “Capital structure around the world: The roles of firm-
and country-specific determinants” published on Journal of Banking and Finance studied 
the effect of both firm-specific and country-specific determinants on the capital structure of 
public firms in more than 40 countries across the globe. The paper demonstrated a significant 
correlation between a set of firm-specific determinants, which include tangibility, firm size, 
growth opportunities and profitability, and leverage ratio. For the macroeconomic factors, 
the authors found that the development of the bond market and the GDP growth rate also 
have significant impacts on the capital structure. They also found evidence of the existence 
of the country effect on determinants of capital structure, as different determinants showed 
different impacts on leverage ratio for public firms operating in different geographical 
locations. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Like previous literature and academic papers examining determinants of capital structure 
across firms, the data set in this thesis is categorized as panel data, which includes both cross-
sectional and time-series observations. As the nature of panel data set, the three most 
common approaches used in previous literature are Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), fixed 
effect and random effect method. OLS is least preferred in previous literature because of the 
likelihood of endogeneity or heteroscedasticity; as a result, fixed effect and random effect 
are more often adopted by previous literature. This chapter provides a comparative analysis 
of these empirical methods.  
3.2 Pooled OLS Regression versus Fixed Effects Model 
The simple standard OLS regression model for a panel data with cross-sectional individual 
(𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛) and time period t (𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛) can be written as follows:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (1) 
in which 𝑥𝑖𝑡  is the k-dimensional vector of the independent variables and 𝛽 is the slope 
coefficients for the independent variables. The error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 captured all the unobserved 
factors that have an effect on 𝑦𝑖𝑡 (Brooks, 2008). Residuals value for the error term 𝑢𝑖?̂? is 
measured as follows:  
𝑢𝑖?̂? = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖𝑡 ̂ (2) 
The pooled OLS regression is based on a following set of assumptions:  
 The expected mean value for the error terms given X should be equal to 0, or  
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋) = 0  
which indicates independent variables should capture all effects and only the unpredictable 
randomness left over to the error terms. Therefore, the expected mean value for the error 
terms should be equal to 0 and there is no clear pattern for the residuals. Figure 1 below 
illustrates the scatter plots for residuals in two scenarios: random scatter plots which 
indicates there is no correlation between error terms and independent variables, and 
“pattern” scatter plots which indicates there are still some uncaptured effects left in the error 
terms that the independent variables are not able to predict.
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Figure 1: Residuals Scatter Plots Illustration: random vs. pattern 
Figure 1 provides the illustration of the distribution of residuals presented as scatter plots. The left scatter plot indicates the randomness in the 
distribution, and the mean value for residuals should equal to 0. The right scatter plot shows a clear pattern, which indicates there are still some 
uncaptured effects left over that the indepndent variables failed to predict.  
 
                             (random distribution)                                                                   (pattern distribution) 
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 Another assumption is that all observations are independent and identically distributed 
over the times series, which means a set of (𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡) should have the same distribution 
as (𝑥𝑗𝑡, 𝑦𝑗𝑡) and (𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝑦𝑖𝑡) is independent from (𝑥𝑗𝑡, 𝑦𝑗𝑡) for all i different from j. One 
important implication for the independent and identically distributed property is the 
homoscedasticity, which implies the error terms across all values of independent 
variables are constant. If the error terms are not constant across independent variables, 
then there is the existence of heteroscedasticity in the data model. An example for the 
heteroscedasticity is the case of the relationship between age and salary level: the 
variance in wages for people in the age between 20s-30s is pretty small, because most 
of them are students or fresh graduates entering early stage of their career. However, 
as these people get older, they are more likely to differentiate in career development 
to each other, and thus the gap between wage levels become much more noticeable. 
Some people working in large corporates have much higher salary level than people 
working part-time at McDonald, for an example. Therefore, in this case, there is the 
variation in the difference between wage level for different ages, which represents the 
heteroscedasticity in the regression model. 
Because of the strict assumptions mentioned above, most often using Pooled OLS 
regression for time-series analysis is not preferred if the assumptions are not met. More 
specifically, when there is the existence of auto-correlation, multicollinearity or 
heteroscedasticity, Pooled OLS regression will result in inconsistent and biased estimators. 
Most of the time, the problem with the Pooled OLS model stays within the error terms with 
very strict assumptions. In order to tackle this problem, fixed effects models further split the 
error terms 𝑢𝑖𝑡 into two different components, which consist of an individual specific effect 
 𝜇𝑖  and the remain unexplained disturbance 𝑣𝑖𝑡 . In this case, the equation (1) of OLS 
regression could be rewritten for the fixed effects model as below:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  (3) 
in which 𝜇𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛) are fixed unknown constant that captures all the time-invariant 
variables that have effects on 𝑦𝑖𝑡, unlike the Pooled OLS model. And due to the fact that this 
equation (3) have both constant 𝛼 and 𝜇𝑖 , the intercept term 𝛼 is then removed from the 
equation without affecting the equation because individual intercept 𝜇𝑖 has captured already 
the effect of the intercept term 𝛼. Because of the separation between time-invariant effect 
and remain unexplained effects in the error terms, fixed effects models are less likely to 
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result in biased or inconsistent estimators than Pooled OLS regression model, even when 
there is the existence of heteroscedasticity, or there is a correlation between error terms and 
independent variables. 
In summary, due to the fact that the data set used in this paper is panel data with cross-
sectional independent variables over a time series from 2004 to 2017, using Pooled OLS 
regression is most likely to result in biased and inconsistent estimators because of the 
drawbacks in the strict assumptions of the model discussed above. Therefore, in this paper, 
fixed effects model will be used to find the estimators for firm-specific determinants on the 
capital structure of public firms in the Nordic region. In the next section, I will discuss the 
fixed effects model used for the data set in this paper in more details. 
3.3 The Fixed Effects Model 
For firm-specific determinants, details on fixed effect regression model is described below:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀 
in which 𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the leverage ratio, calculated by dividing the book value of long-term debt 
to the book value of total assets. For the explanatory firm-specific variables in the regression 
model, it includes tangibility (TAN), firm size (SIZE), business risk (RISK), non-debt tax 
shields (NDTS), growth opportunities (GROWTH), profitability (PROFIT) and liquidity 
(LIQ). More details on each firm-specific determinants are presented in the next chapter.  
After testing the multicollinearity between independent variables by using pairwise 
correlation matrix, it is also necessary to test the existence of heteroscedasticity in the panel 
data set. In this paper, I use Breush-Pagan test (or White test) to detect the heteroscedasticity. 
More specifically, if the t-statistic result of the Breush-Pagan test is significantly different 
from zero at 5% or 1% confidence level, then there is the existence of the heteroscedasticity 
in the sample data set. In that case, the Pooled OLS is no longer a reliable regression method 
to be used for my panel data set. 
After the Breush-Pagan test, to further support the selection between fixed effects and 
random effects model, I will use Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (or Hausman specification test) 
to examine the difference between values of coefficients across two methods. In this paper, 
as the result for the Hausman specification test is significantly large, the fixed effects model 
is preferred to the random effects model. 
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For country-specific determinants, the equation is the extent model of the firm-specific 
determinant model by adding additional macroeconomic indicators to the equation as below: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡𝜀 
in which macroeconomic indicators consist of development of the banking industry 
(BANK), development of the stock market (STOCK), development of the bond market 
(BOND), GDP growth rate (GDPGROWTH) and inflation rate (INFLATION). More details 
on each country-specific determinants are also presented in the next chapter. However, 
unlike the firm-specific determinants, I use the Pooled OLS model to study the impact of 
country-specific determinants on the capital structure. The reason is that fixed effect model 
cannot tolerate the constant variance between different firms in the same country for 
macroeconomic indicators.    
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4 Data and Samples 
This section is to describe the sample set used to analyze in this thesis, as well as to provide 
a more detailed data selection procedure and an overview on some key statistics of the 
sample set, including descriptive statistics and correlation matrix on firm-specific 
determinants. 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Firm-specific and country-specific determinants are the two major types of variables that I 
take into account in analyzing their impacts on firms’ leverage ratio. Using solely firm-
specific determinants to analyze their impacts on leverage ratio could provide meaningful 
results. However, these results are not comprehensive due to the fact that the use of debt in 
public firms may vary across different countries because of difference in economic 
environment, legal framework, inflation and other economic indicators. Therefore, when 
analyzing the impacts of determinants on capital structure across several countries, it is 
necessary to include country-specific economic indicators into the analysis.  
In my regression model, long-term debt to book value of total assets ratio is my main 
dependent variable. Some previous literature use total debt ratio as an alternative option for 
their dependent variable; however, I find that the total debt ratio might not truly reflect the 
leverage level of the company in the long term as it also includes the proportion of short-
term debt which is due within one year. Although short-term debt is an important factor 
when evaluating firms’ current performance, its nature makes it become a poor indicator for 
the performance in a longer time horizon. Therefore, in this paper, long-term debt ratio is 
selected as my main dependent variable, and total debt ratio is used mainly for comparison 
and robustness check purpose.  
For firm-specific determinants, the primary source is Thomson Reuters Eikon 
Database, which contains financials on companies from a wide range of industries. I restrict 
my sample set to those firms listed on the stock market of the country in which it is 
domiciled. The initial sample set covers five Nordic countries, including Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, Denmark and Iceland. However, after the extracting-and-transforming process, 
there were only 15 firms available for the Iceland market for the covered period from 2004 
to 2017, while for other countries the minimum firm number was 66 (Denmark). Due to the 
fact that including these 15 public firms from Iceland is likely to make the pooled data set 
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imbalanced because of its small number of observations, my final data set, as a result, 
excludes Iceland and includes Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden.  
For macroeconomic indicators, the primary source includes World Development 
Indicators and Financial Structure Database of the World Bank. My initial sample period 
covers the years 2004 – 2018, initially. However, most of the required country-specific data 
are only available until 2017, thus my final sample set covers the period of 2004 – 2017. 
For my initial sample set, 756 listed firms were identified in the Nasdaq Stockholm, 
203 listed firms were identified in the Oslo Stock Exchange, 139 listed firms were identified 
in the Nasdaq Helsinki and 115 listed firms were identified in the Nasdaq Copenhagen. My 
selection and screening procedure is based on two sets of rules: the first rule is that all 
financial companies including banks, financial firms, investment or insurance firms will be 
excluded from the final sample set. The main reason is that these financial companies are 
more likely to have a much higher liquidity that affects their unique capital structure. The 
second rule is that all companies with overwhelming missing observations are excluded from 
the final sample set. While most often it is impossible to have all available firm-year 
observations for four countries, I resort to some other alternative sources to collect the 
missing data if possible, including collecting missing data from firms’ financial statements 
manually. As a general rule, I exclude all public firms with missing values for more than 6 
years in the total covered period of 14 years (from 2004 to 2017) from the initial sample set. 
In the end, my final sample set for each country includes 272 Swedish listed firms, 
131 Norwegian listed firms, 95 Finnish listed firms and 67 Danish listed firms. The pooled 
sample consists of a strongly balanced panel of 565 listed firms over a period of 14 years 
from 2004 to 2017 in Nordic markets, totaling 7,910 firm-year observations. Table 1 
provides a description of the final sample set.  
Table 1: The Final Sample Set 
Table 1 provides a description of the final sample set: the number of years that data are available for each country, 
the number of firms per year for each country, the total firm-year observations and the proportion of selected firms 
in the final sample by the total number of listed firms in each country  
Country 
Number of Years of Data 
Used 
Number of Firms in 
the Final Sample 
Firm-years 
Observations 
Number of Firms in the Final 
Sample/Total Number of Listed Firms 
Denmark 14 67 938 58% 
Finland 14 95 1,330 68% 
Norway 14 131 1,834 64% 
Sweden 14 272 3,808 36% 
Total  565 7,910  
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4.2 Dependent Variable 
The three most common measurement for leverage ratio are long-term debt ratio, short-term 
debt ratio and total debt ratio (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Huang, 2006). In 
this paper, long-term debt ratio is my main dependent variable, and total debt ratio is only 
used for comparison and robustness test purpose. The reason for adopting long-term debt 
ratio instead of the other two is because the main objective of this paper is to find the 
relationship between a set of determinants on both firm-specific and country-specific level 
and the level of debt for public firms in the long run. Meanwhile, short-term debt is mostly 
used for short-term analysis and therefore, total debt ratio might not truly reflect the leverage 
level of these public firms in the long-term.  
In this paper, the long-term debt ratio is measured as the ratio of the book value of 
long-term debt to the reported book value of total assets and calculated as follows:  
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐿𝐸𝑉) =
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Table 2 and Table 3 below show the average of long-term debt ratio and average of 
total debt ratio for listed firms in the Nordic region. As it can be seen from the two tables, 
across four Nordic countries, except for Sweden, total debt ratio adopted by public firms 
ranges from 25% to 30%: on average, public firms in Norway adopt the highest level of total 
debt (31%), while firms in Sweden adopt a much lower level of total debt (16%). On the 
other hand, from these two tables, we can estimate that most of public firms in Nordic region 
adopt short-term debt at around 6%-8% on average. In terms of long-term debt ratio, public 
firms in Denmark and Finland are very similar in adopted level of long-term debt (16%-
17%), while public firms in Norway have around 22% of long-term debt on average for the 
period from 2004 to 2017. 
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Table 2: The Average Long-term Debt Ratio across Nordic countries  
Table 2 provides the average value of long-term debt ratio (LEV) across four Nordic countries including 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in the period 2004 – 2017.  
Long-term Debt Ratio 2004 – 2017 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2004 16.35 % 15.20 % 19.45 % 10.70 % 
2005 17.87 % 14.06 % 19.40 % 10.49 % 
2006 17.84 % 14.57 % 19.37 % 10.15 % 
2007 14.40 % 15.72 % 22.78 % 11.09 % 
2008 17.87 % 18.70 % 23.50 % 12.56 % 
2009 20.79 % 18.67 % 22.64 % 11.70 % 
2010 20.41 % 16.52 % 22.49 % 10.40 % 
2011 19.24 % 18.02 % 23.34 % 11.02 % 
2012 16.98 % 15.92 % 21.97 % 10.65 % 
2013 17.87 % 17.05 % 23.18 % 10.02 % 
2014 14.38 % 15.74 % 20.77 % 10.06 % 
2015 15.93 % 16.75 % 21.56 % 10.44 % 
2016 16.26 % 18.16 % 22.16 % 10.60 % 
2017 16.46 % 15.13 % 21.69 % 10.81 % 
Average 17.33 % 16.44 % 21.74 % 10.76 % 
 
 
Table 3: The Average Total Debt Ratio across Nordic countries  
Table 3 provides the average value of total debt ratio across four Nordic countries including Denmark, 
Finland, Norway and Sweden in the period 2004 – 2017.  
Total Debt Ratio 2004 – 2017 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
2004 26.25 % 21.99 % 28.98 % 15.69 % 
2005 27.02 % 20.56 % 25.40 % 16.40 % 
2006 30.00 % 21.14 % 27.27 % 14.94 % 
2007 26.01 % 24.41 % 28.92 % 16.35 % 
2008 29.66 % 28.58 % 33.91 % 18.76 % 
2009 30.79 % 27.26 % 32.12 % 16.93 % 
2010 29.83 % 24.08 % 34.82 % 15.96 % 
2011 26.99 % 26.65 % 34.43 % 16.67 % 
2012 27.74 % 24.47 % 33.53 % 16.87 % 
2013 25.66 % 25.88 % 29.96 % 16.22 % 
2014 22.87 % 24.57 % 29.29 % 15.49 % 
2015 23.55 % 24.64 % 31.71 % 16.14 % 
2016 22.53 % 24.64 % 31.28 % 16.35 % 
2017 22.36 % 21.86 % 30.60 % 16.60 % 
Average 26.52 % 24.33 % 30.87 % 16.38 % 
 
 
4.3 Independent Variables 
In this paper, the independent variables and their measurement are selected because they 
have been widely adopted by prior empirical literatures in the past years. Additionally, I 
believe this consistency in variable selection is helpful in comparing the results with existing 
empirical studies, especially when comparing with other developed economies in Europe 
and in the U.S. Generally, independent variables consist of two sets of variables: firm-
specific determinants and country-specific determinants; details on each variable are 
presented below. 
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4.3.1 Firm-specific independent variables 
Although the topic on how we could select a set of firm-level factors that have impacts on 
the capital structure are quite controversial in previous literature, most of the selection were 
based on traditional capital structure theories, including static trade-off theory, pecking order 
theory, agency cost and asymmetric information. Among different models adopted in prior 
empirical studies, the most commonly used variables as firm-specific determinants of capital 
structure are tangibility, firm size, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunity, business risk, 
profitability and liquidity.  
4.3.1.1 Tangibility (TANG) 
Tangibility measured the percentage of tangible assets in total assets, and is defined as the 
ratio of fixed assets to the book value of total assets. In this paper, tangibility (TANG) is 
calculated as below.  
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺) =
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
On the relationship between tangibility and the capital structure, trade-off theory 
suggests that a firm with higher level of tangibility can use these additional assets as 
collateral when seeking for external finance. For these firms, they are more likely to have a 
lower cost of debt compared to other public firms whose proportion of tangible assets is low. 
This could be explained from the perspective of the lenders that a higher portion of collateral 
would diminish their lending risk; as a result, these lenders are more likely to require a lower 
cost of debt from the borrowers. Furthermore, the liquidation value of a public firm increases 
with the tangibility of its assets and, at the same time, decreases the probability of mispricing 
in the event of bankruptcy (Deesomsak et al., 2004). Therefore, a high ratio of tangible assets 
is expected to be associated with a high level of adopted leverage for public firms. Prior 
literature also found a statistically significant positive relationship between tangibility and 
leverage (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; De Jong et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, this relationship between tangibility and leverage could also be 
explained by the fact that public firms with higher proportion of tangible assets in general 
are more likely to be in a mature industry and therefore these firms can afford higher level 
of debt to take advantage of their lower risk level. However, this really depends on which 
industry these firms are operating: for an example, public firms operating in IT industry 
usually have a large portion of intangible assets; as a result, their capital choice may differ 
from what the pecking-order theory suggested, especially when their lenders are more likely 
to require excessive premiums for the higher risk of lending. And because of the higher cost 
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of debt, these firms may prefer equity issue to debt when they need financing. To discuss 
even further about the industry effects on tangibility and leverage, all public firms in my 
dataset are also categorized under different sectors following the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS). Table 4 and Table 5 below show the average of tangibility 
and the average of leverage ratio for Nordic public firms. 
Table 4: The Average Tangibility across GICS sectors for Nordic public firms  
Table 4 provides the average tangibility of the period 2004 – 2017 across GICS sectors. 
GICS Sector Name Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Communication Services 52.39 % 48.81 % 45.99 % 43.15 % 
Consumer Discretionary 53.79 % 33.93 % 38.32 % 23.80 % 
Consumer Staples 57.96 % 47.78 % 46.51 % 40.42 % 
Energy 75.30 % 59.70 % 65.20 % 62.05 % 
Health Care 26.85 % 32.49 % 30.34 % 38.79 % 
Industrials 42.45 % 30.84 % 49.06 % 30.77 % 
Information Technology 32.06 % 22.85 % 23.04 % 21.45 % 
Materials 57.77 % 48.57 % 48.88 % 61.23 % 
Real Estates 71.44 % 73.02 % 72.38 % 66.11 % 
Utilities 62.62 % 75.37 % 69.27 % 49.97 % 
 
 
Table 5: The Average Total Debt Ratio across GICS sectors for Nordic public firms  
Table 5 provides the average total debt ratio of the period 2004 – 2017 across GICS sectors. 
GICS Sector Name Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Communication Services 20.17 % 29.13 % 20.21 % 16.52 % 
Consumer Discretionary 37.03 % 25.67 % 28.35 % 16.47 % 
Consumer Staples 22.08 % 23.68 % 33.32 % 18.13 % 
Energy 38.22 % 24.12 % 38.76 % 17.18 % 
Health Care 19.73 % 19.33 % 13.05 % 10.45 % 
Industrials 27.47 % 24.88 % 32.51 % 19.60 % 
Information Technology 12.47 % 21.20 % 19.33 % 10.02 % 
Materials 32.50 % 28.70 % 21.30 % 16.50 % 
Real Estates 63.10 % 14.84 % 39.04 % 41.39 % 
Utilities 27.23 % 30.70 % 47.83 % 21.77 % 
 
As it can be seen from the two tables, for public firms operating in real estates, energy 
and utilities sector, they have a very high portion of tangible assets; meanwhile, firms 
operating in health care and IT sector have a relatively lower level of tangible assets. These 
figures are reasonable because real estates, energy and utilities sectors, unlike the service 
industry, are very capital intensive and much often require a larger amount of initial 
investments on infrastructure and PPE (property, plant and equipment) for their projects. For 
the total debt ratio for these firms, they also have a much higher leverage (63.10%, real estate 
sector, Denmark) compared to health care (19.73%, Denmark) and especially IT sector 
(12.47%, Denmark). These figures are consistent with the trade-off theory and the earlier 
discussions in this section.   
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4.3.1.2 Firm Size (SIZE) 
In this paper, firm size measures the scale of public firms by using the natural logarithm of 
the book value of their total assets and is calculated as below. 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) = ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
On the relationship between the size of public firms and their leverage ratio, theories 
suggested that these two variables have a positive relationship, although their explanation 
may differ. From the point of view of static trade-off theory, public firms always have to 
balance or make trade-off decision: on the one hand are the benefits of leverage, including 
tax savings and higher return on investment, and on the other hand are the costs of high 
leverage, including risk of bankruptcy, higher cost of debt, and financial distress. However, 
for large public firms, their operations are more diversified than the others, their business 
stage is more mature, and their reputation is already secured in the industry. As a result, not 
only big firms are willing to trade-off “more” for the benefits to the costs of high leverage, 
but also lenders are more likely to offer them some kinds of “discount” on borrowings 
because of the safe and secured reputation. On the other hand, smaller firms, due to their 
higher risk of lending, either have a higher cost of debt for their debt financing, or may prefer 
equity financing as an alternative for their need of external financing. Prior studies also found 
a positive relationship between firm size and leverage ratio (Titman et al., 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999). Figure 2 and Figure 3 below show the average long-term debt 
ratio for five biggest public firms and five smallest public firms in terms of their total assets. 
Figure 2: The Average Long-term Debt Ratio of Five Biggest Nordic Public Firms  
Figure 2 provides the average long-term debt ratio of the period 2004 – 2017 of five biggest public firms in 
terms of their total assets. 
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Figure 3: The Average Long-term Debt Ratio of Five Smallest Nordic Public Firms  
Figure 3 provides the average long-term debt ratio of the period 2004 – 2017 of five smallest public firms in 
terms of their total assets. 
 
As it can be seen from the two figures, in terms of total assets, five biggest public firms 
in Nordic consist of AP Moeller – Maersk A/S (a Danish business conglomerate operating 
mainly in the transport, energy and logistics sector), Equinor ASA (a Norwegian 
multinational petroleum and wind energy company), Fortum Oyj (a Finnish leading clean-
energy company), Nokia Oyj (a Finnish multinational communications and IT company) 
and Telia Company AB (a Swedish dominant telephone company and mobile network 
operator). These firms have been adopting an average of around 16% - 26% for long-term 
debt during the period from 2004 to 2017, with Nokia Oyj is the only exception with average 
ratio around 8%. On the other hand, five smallest public firms in terms of total assets either 
have been operating on a very low portion of long-term debt, around 4% - 7% on average, 
or no long-term debt at all. These figures are consistent with the static trade-off theory 
discussed above. 
4.3.1.3 Business Risk (RISK) 
In this paper, business risk measured the volatility of public firms’ earnings as an indicator 
for probability of bankruptcy and financial distress. Business risk is calculated as the 
absolute difference between annual percentage change in operating income, or earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT), and the mean value of these changes.  
𝐵𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 (𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾) = |% Growth(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇) − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(%𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇))| 
However, prior literature used different measurements to calculate the business risk: 
the method mentioned above follows the method used by Deesomsak et al. (2004); on the 
other hand, Booth et al. (2001) measured the business risk using variability of the returns on 
assets over the sample period. While the increased variability in the returns on assets implies 
an increase in the short-term operational component of the business risk, one of the drawback 
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of this measurement is that it cannot capture the component of the risk in the longer-term, 
such as competitive entry (Booth et al., 2001). Theoretically, trade-off theory and bankruptcy 
costs suggested that public firms with volatile earnings have higher probability of 
bankruptcy and financial distress, as these firms may not be able to fulfil their debt 
commitments. Therefore, a high volatility in earnings reduces firms’ capacity for debt 
financing and the business risk is expected to be negatively correlated with leverage.  
In practice, prior literature showed mixed results for the relationship between leverage 
ratio and the business risk: earnings volatility appears to have no significant effect on 
leverage in all four Asian countries in the sample, including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Australia (Deesomsak et al., 2004); on the other hand, leverage ratio is positively 
correlated with the business risk in Jordan, and vice versa in Korea (Booth et al., 2001). One 
of the explanation for the mixed results is that in some cases, public firms may not take into 
account the volatility of their earnings for their debt financing decision if the risks and costs 
of entering into liquidation for these firms are not significant, which may be the case in 
Australia when public firms have their borrowing level well below their debt servicing 
capacity (Deesomsak et al., 2004).  
4.3.1.4 Non-debt Tax Shields (NDTS) 
In this paper, non-debt tax shields is measured as the ratio of depreciation and amortization 
to the book value of total assets, due to the fact that depreciation and amortization are the 
most significant elements in the non-debt tax shield and is calculated as below. 
𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑠 (𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆) =
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
From the point of view of the static trade-off theory, one of the main reasons why some 
public firms prefer debt financing to equity financing is because they want to utilize 
corporate tax deductions. However, depreciation, in addition to investment tax credits, can 
also be served as non-debt tax shields to reduce the corporate tax for these firms; therefore, 
these non-debt tax shields are considered as an alternative for the tax benefits of debt 
financing (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980). As a result, public firms with greater non-debt tax 
deductions are less likely to choose debt for their external financing, because they have less 
incentives for the tax deducted benefits provided by debt (Wald, 1999).  
Most of the existing literature also found a significant negative relationship between 
non-debt tax shields and leverage ratio (DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980; Wald, 1999; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004). For any prior studies that found a positive coefficient on 
depreciation and amortization (Bradley et al., 1984), one of the explanation is that because 
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their measurement does not include the amount of property, plant and equipment (PPE) in 
their regression models. Since these two independent variables are highly correlated, both 
variables need to be included in the regression model to segregate their effects (Wald, 1999). 
In this paper, the set of firm-specific independent variables does not include PPE variable. 
However, while the original regression model by Wald (1999) does not include tangibility 
variable, the tangibility ratio used in this paper can be considered as an alternative for PPE 
variable because these two variables are highly correlated, thus they should yield a similar 
effect on leverage.  
4.3.1.5 Growth Opportunity (GROWTH) 
In this paper, growth opportunity measures the growth of the book value of total assets and 
is calculated as below. 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻) = %change (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
Theoretically, from the point of view of the static trade-off theory, growth opportunity 
is considered as a type of intangible assets, and public firms with higher growth opportunity 
are more flexible with their future investments. In order to avoid agency conflicts such as 
debt overhang or asset substitution that equally make equity holders behave sub-optimally, 
these firms have more incentives to use internal finance sources or equity to finance their 
investment projects, instead of seeking for external debt financing (Wald, 1999). Moreover, 
because of the agency conflicts mentioned above, the costs of borrowing for these high 
growth public firms tend to be higher than the costs for lower growth public firms. As a 
result, public firms with higher growth are more likely to prefer equity financing to debt 
financing.  
Prior studies use different indicators to capture growth opportunity for public firms: 
five-year average of sales growth (Wald, 1999), market-to-book value of total assets 
(Deesomsak et al., 2004), or the percentage change in the book value of total assets (Titman 
et al., 1988). Despite of different measurements, they all found an inverse relationship 
between growth opportunity and leverage ratio.  
4.3.1.6 Profitability (PROFIT) 
In this paper, profitability measures a company’s ability to generate revenue through its 
existing assets and is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to the 
book value of total assets. Profitability is calculated as below. 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇) =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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Theoretically, from the point of view of the static trade-off theory, in order to utilize 
tax shield benefits, profitable public firms have more incentives to seek for debt financing 
compared to less profitable public firms. Furthermore, banks and debt suppliers in the market 
are inclined to lend to profitable firms because of the higher probability to redeem debts and 
lower risks of bankruptcy (Rajan et al., 1995). Therefore, profitability is expected to be 
positively correlated with leverage ratio.  
On the other hand, from the point of view of the pecking order theory, in order to avoid 
information asymmetries issue between corporate insiders and outside investors, public 
firms in general prefer to finance their investments and operations from retained earnings 
first, then from debt financing and finally from issuing new equity to the market. Moreover, 
less profitable public firms probably will have less available earnings for retaining purpose, 
thus these firms have higher demand for external financing. As a result, unlike the static 
trade-off theory, the pecking order theory suggests that the profitability is negatively 
associated with leverage ratio. Most of the existing literature also found a significant 
relationship between these two variables (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Huang, 
2006). 
4.3.1.7 Liquidity (LIQ) 
In this paper, liquidity measures how much assets that public firms could convert into cash 
to pay for their short-term debt obligations and is defined as the ratio of total current assets 
to total current liabilities. Liquidity is calculated as below. 
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐿𝐼𝑄) =
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Theoretically, from the point of view of the pecking order theory, public firms with 
high liquidity have less incentives to borrow compared to public firms with low liquidity, 
because these firms could utilize their liquid assets for future investment opportunities as a 
trusted financial source. Moreover, managers could manipulate liquid assets in favor of 
shareholders against the interest of debt holders, which may increase the agency costs of 
debt and make debt financing become less preferred (Deesomsak et al., 2004). Thus, 
liquidity is expected to be negatively correlated with leverage ratio.  
On the other hand, from the point of view of the static trade-off theory, public firms 
with high liquidity also face a lower risk of bankruptcy due to their ability to pay for their 
short-term debt obligations. This allows these pubic firms to utilize a higher level of leverage 
to take advantage of their lower default risk and their lower cost of debt compared to other 
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public firms. Therefore, unlike the pecking order theory, the static trade-off theory suggests 
that liquidity is positively associated with leverage ratio.  
In practice, most of the existing literature found a negative relationship between 
liquidity and leverage ratio (Deesomsak et al., 2004; Eriotis et al., 2007), indicating that the 
effect of the pecking order theory may be stronger than the effect of the static trade-off 
theory.  
4.3.1.8 Firm-specific Independent Variables Summary  
Table 6 below provides a summary descriptive statistics of the set of firm-specific 
independent variables discussed earlier. As it can be seen from the figures that public firms 
in Sweden and Finland have a significantly lower amount of tangible assets compared to 
public firms in Norway and Denmark. It may be because there is an existing industrial effect 
on tangibility between public firms in different industry sectors, and a higher proportion of 
Swedish and Finnish listed firms operating in IT sector or other equivalent sectors that are 
less capital intensive leads to the average tangibility ratio in Sweden and Finland to be lower 
in comparison to the other two Nordic countries.  
Theoretically, different industries have significant differences in terms of institutional 
characteristics, including business risk, the required amount of tangible assets for operations, 
growth prospects or corporate tax rate. Prior literature also demonstrated that the 
requirement of external finance by public firms varies across different industries (Huang, 
2006; De Jong et al., 2008). For an example, public firms operating in an industry with 
greater growth opportunity are more likely to have a higher amount of potential investments, 
which lead to a lower level of debt in order to avoid agency problems. Another example is 
that public firms operating in IT industry tend to have large amount of intangible assets and 
insignificant amount of tangible assets compared to other industries; therefore, these firms 
are more likely to prefer equity financing to debt financing in order to avoid high costs of 
debt. Because the industry classification and capital structure decision are closely related to 
each other, in order to examine how industrial factors have their impacts on the leverage 
ratio, in this paper all public firms are classified into ten industrial sectors following the 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Table 7 below provides an overview of 
industrial classification across four Nordic countries. As it can be seen from the figures, the 
proportion of IT public firms is highest in Sweden and Finland, which is relevant to my 
aforementioned discussion that a low ratio of tangibility in Sweden and Finland may be 
caused by a high percentage of IT public firms and a low percentage of real estate firms. 
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Table 6: Desciptive Statistics of Firm-specific Indpendent Variables  
Table 6 provides a descriptive statistics of firm-specific independent variables in 2004 – 2017 period. TANG 
(tangibility) is the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. SIZE (firm size) is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
RISK (business risk) is the absolute difference between the percentage change in EBIT and the mean of these 
changes. NDTS (Non-debt tax shields) is the ratio of depreciation and amortization to total assets. GROWTH 
(growth opportunity) is the percentage change of total assets. PROFIT (profitability) is the ratio of EBIT to 
total assets. LIQ (liquidity) is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities.  
Country TANG SIZE RISK NDTS GROWTH PROFIT LIQ 
Denmark        
Mean 0.46 19.16 2.41 0.04 0.16 0.03 2.44 
S.D 0.26 2.33 8.52 0.04 1.12 0.24 6.46 
Min 0 11.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.99 -3.05 0.04 
Max 0.99 24.79 137.01 0.30 24.67 0.51 157.56 
        
Finland        
Mean 0.35 19.28 3.37 0.04 0.09 0.06 1.74 
S.D 0.19 2.09 25.91 0.03 0.51 0.12 2.05 
Min 0 13.41 0.00 0 -0.79 -2.14 0.56 
Max 0.98 24.52 798.47 0.67 10.17 0.54 54.55 
        
Norway        
Mean 0.51 19.27 2.28 0.05 0.39 -0.03 2.64 
S.D 0.28 2.16 7.30 0.08 3.23 0.37 7.69 
Min 0 11.57 0 0 -0.99 -5.44 0.04 
Max 0.99 25.42 126.37 2.04 97.23 2.15 243.60 
        
Sweden        
Mean 0.35 17.39 7.90 0.05 0.37 -0.05 2.90 
S.D 0.26 2.55 109.94 0.22 2.14 0.42 10.55 
Min 0 8.79 0 -0.02 -0.99 -14.87 0.01 
Max 0.99 24.10 4877.76 9.36 50.61 3.65 329.94 
 
Table 7: The Percentage of Public Firms Classified by Industrial Sectors across Nordic Countries 
Table 7 provides the summary of percentage of public firms classified by industrial sectors across four Nordic 
countries including Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Industrial classification follows the standard 
classification of Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code.  
Industrial Sector Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Communication Services 9% 7% 4% 7% 
Consumer Discretionary 9% 11% 4% 11% 
Consumer Staples 9% 7% 7% 4% 
Energy 3% 1% 33% 2% 
Healthcare 17% 5% 5% 16% 
Industrials 32% 36% 20% 27% 
Information Technology 8% 22% 14% 19% 
Materials 6% 8% 6% 8% 
Real Estates 3% 1% 7% 4% 
Utilities 5% 1% 2% 1% 
 
Table 8 below provides a summary of the firm-specific independent variables, their 
measurements as well as the expected sign in relation to leverage ratio. These relationship 
have been discussed in the earlier sections. 
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Table 8: Summary of Firm-specific Independent Variables 
Table 8 provides a summary measurement of firm-specific independent variables and their expected sign in 
relation to leverage ratio. The set of firm-specific independent variables consists of tangibility, firm size, 
business risk, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunity, profitability and liquidity.  
Firm-specific factors Indicators Expected sign 
Tangibility (TANG) 
𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 + 
Firm size (SIZE) ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + 
Business risk (RISK) |% Growth(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇) − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛(%𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇))| - 
Non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 - 
Growth (GROWTH) %𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) - 
Profitability (PROFIT) 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 - 
Liquidity (LIQ) 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 - 
 
Table 9 below provides the correlation matrix between dependent variable, which is 
long-term debt ratio (LEV), and firm-specific independent variables including tangibility 
(TANG), firm size (SIZE), non-debt tax shields (NDTS), growth opportunity (GROWTH), 
business risk (RISK), profitability (PROFIT) and liquidity (LIQ). Among the correlation 
coefficients, I find that the correlation coefficient between tangibility and firm size is quite 
high at around 45%. Other than that, most correlation coefficients are very small; thus, there 
is little concern about the collinearity between firm-specific independent variables.  
Table 9: Correlation Matrix 
Table 9 provides the correlation matrix between dependent variable, which is long-term debt ratio (LEV), and 
firm-specific independent variables including tangibility (TANG), firm size (SIZE), non-debt tax shields 
(NDTS), growth opportunity (GROWTH), business risk (RISK), profitability (PROFIT) and liquidity (LIQ). 
 LEV TANG SIZE NDTS LIQ GROWTH PROFIT RISK 
LEV 1.000        
TANG 0.452 1.000       
SIZE 0.385 0.221 1.000      
NDTS -0.025 0.071 -0.116 1.000     
LIQ -0.088 -0.075 -0.120 -0.029 1.000    
GROWTH -0.011 -0.005 -0.038 -0.036 0.054 1.000   
PROFIT 0.085 -0.006 0.354 -0.332 -0.022 0.009 1.000  
RISK -0.007 0.017 -0.051 0.091 0.037 0.078 -0.008 1.000 
 
4.3.2 Country-specific Independent Variables 
Prior literature presented that public firms in various institutional characteristics have 
diverse financing decisions, since external environment is one of the most dominant factors 
to either encourage or constrain how firms choose their external financing sources. While 
external environment includes both country-specific factors and industry-specific factors, 
most of the existing empirical studies found a significant correlation between country-
specific factors and the leverage ratio (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; De Jong 
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et al., 2008). Furthermore, after the financial crisis in 2008, the financial system as a whole 
as well as the external financial environment has been reformed and enforced with more 
policies and stricter legal regulations. Thus, institutional and country-specific determinants 
are also helpful to understand more thoroughly the issue of corporate finance behaviors, 
especially in the Nordic context as the scope of this paper.  
While there is a significant amount of existing literature studying the impact of 
country-specific factors on leverage, the most commonly adopted country-factors include 
the development of the banking industry in relation to the financial market, GDP growth 
rate, the development of the stock market, the development of the bond market and inflation 
rate. Some prior empirical studies also included legal system variable by defining an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the country’s legal system is based on common 
law, and 0 otherwise (La Porta et al., 1998; Deesomsak et al., 2004; Fan et al., 2012). 
However, in this paper I do not adopt this variable into the regression model mainly because 
all four countries in the full sample set are using the same civil law system. Instead, five 
proxies are selected in the aspect of country-specific factors, including the development of 
the banking industry, the development of the stock market and the bond market, GDP growth 
rate and inflation rate. These variables are collected from the primary source which is World 
Development Indicators and Financial Structure Database of the World Bank. 
Theoretically, different levels of the development of the banking industry may have 
impact on the accessibility to external financing, which helps to explain the difference in the 
level of leverage adopted by public firms in different countries. On the other hand, the 
development of the stock market may help to explain why public firms in one country prefer 
equity financing to debt financing than public firms in other countries. Inflation is another 
factor that may have impact on the choice of capital structure: from the lender’s perspective, 
high inflation discourages the lender to provide long-term debt as debt contracts are 
generally in nominal terms and high inflation makes the lender become worse-off. However, 
from the corporate’s perspective, the cost of debt is lowered in case of high inflation, thus 
the demand for corporate bonds increases in relation to the increase in inflation. 
4.3.2.1 Development of the Banking Industry (BANK) 
In this paper, development of the banking industry measures the size of the domestic banking 
industry and is defined as the ratio of demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks to GDP. The ratio is calculated as below. 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾) =
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃
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Theoretically, size of the banking industry may have impact on the choice of capital 
structure for public firms, as developed and mature banking industry could help these firms 
to get more accessibility to external financing, and thus encourage them to adopt a higher 
level of debt because of the lower cost of capital. Therefore, the development of the banking 
industry is expected to have a positive correlation with leverage. Existing literature also 
found a significant positive relationship between these two variables (Rajan and Zingales, 
1995). However, the authors also noted that the relative importance of banking industry is 
less indicative of the difference in corporate leverage than in the relative amounts of private 
financing such as bank loans and arms-length financing through open market securities 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001). 
4.3.2.2 Development of the Stock Market (STOCK) 
In this paper, development of the stock market is defined as the ratio of the stock market 
capitalization to GDP and is calculated as below.  
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾) =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 
Theoretically, between developed and developing markets, stock market in developed 
countries tends to be larger in trading volume with higher liquidity and smaller volatility 
than the stock market in developing countries. More importantly, during bearish period, 
developed stock market is probably more stable than emerging stock markets. Therefore, 
public firms listed in developed stock markets may prefer equity financing due to the 
transparent and developed stock market environment; thus, stock market development is 
expected to have a negative relationship with leverage ratio. In practice, prior studies also 
found a significant negative correlation between stock market development and leverage 
ratio (Booth et al., 2001). 
4.3.2.3 Development of the Bond Market (BOND) 
In this paper, development of the bond market is defined as the ratio of the total bond market 
capitalization to GDP, in which bond market capitalization is the sum of private and public 
bond market and is calculated below. 
𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷) =
𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 
Theoretically, developed bond market could facilitate issuing more trading bonds and 
thus, increase the leverage level of public firms. More interestingly, prior studies has found 
a counter-intuitive negative effect of the development of the bond market on leverage ratio 
(De Jong et al., 2008). It may be because a strong combination of various sources of 
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financing, including both developed stock market and bond market, could provide a more 
efficient basis for public firms’ financing decision; and for public firms in a country with 
relatively weaker bond market, they are more likely to seek external financing from banks 
or from private sectors, instead of equity issues.  
4.3.2.4 GDP Growth Rate (GDPGROWTH) 
In this paper, GDP growth rate is defined as the annual real GDP growth rate in each country 
and is a common macroeconomic indicator for the overall economy performance in such 
country. The GDP growth rate is calculated as below. 
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻) = % 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 (𝐺𝐷𝑃) 
In practice, prior empirical studies have found very mixed results for the correlation 
between the GDP growth rate and leverage ratio of public firms: Booth et al. (2001) found 
a positive relationship between the two variables in developing countries over the period 
from 1980 to 1990; on the other hand, Gajurel (2005) found a negative relationship between 
the GDP growth rate and debt ratio. One of the reasons for the mixed results in previous 
studies is that for public firms operating in high GDP growth rate markets, these firms have 
less incentives to adopt a large amount of external financing because the economy is already 
providing sufficient investment opportunities and therefore, they tend to adopt a lower level 
of leverage. On the other hand, the positive correlation between GDP growth rate and 
leverage ratio could be seen in competitive markets where concentration level is low. In this 
case, public firms may require more external financing for their operating activities to keep 
up to their competitors in a high growth environment. 
4.3.2.5 Inflation Rate (INFLATION)   
In prior studies, inflation rate is a common macroeconomic indicator to examine the impact 
of price level on debt and equity level of public firms. However, these studies have found 
mixed results for the relationship between inflation rate and leverage ratio. Theoretically, 
from the lender’s perspective, high inflation rate would discourage lenders to provide long-
term debt to public firms as debt contracts are generally fixed in nominal terms and the high 
inflation rate would make these lenders become worse-off. However, from the borrower’s 
perspective, high inflation rate would lower the cost of debt for public firms, therefore, 
demand for corporate bonds is more likely to increase when inflation rate is high. 
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4.3.2.6 Country-specific Independent Variables Summary 
Table 10 below provides a summary of the average value of country-specific factors 
across four Nordic countries. As it can be seen from the figures, across four Nordic countries, 
Sweden and Denmark have a more developed financial systems including banks, stock 
market and bond market, on the other hand, Finland has the least developed bond market 
among four countries.  
Table 10: The Average Value of Country-specific Independent Variables across countries 
Table 10 provides a summary of average value of different country-specifc factors across Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden in the period 2004 – 2017. Data is collected primarily from World Development 
Indicators and Financial Structure Database of the World Bank. 
Country-specific Factors Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Development of Banking Industry (BANK) 189.25% 87.80% 109.54% 125.33% 
Development of Stock Market (STOCK) 63.78% 80.42% 55.59% 99.32% 
Development of Bond Market (BOND) 201.46% 35.75% 46.65% 56.29% 
GDP Growth Rate (GDPGROWTH) 1.16% 1.03% 1.65% 2.27% 
Inflation (INFLATION) 1.57% 1.46% 1.94% 1.06% 
 
Table 11 below provides a summary of the country-specific independent variables’ 
measurement, and their expected sign in relation to leverage ratio for public firms as 
discussed in the earlier sections. 
Table 11: Summary of Country-specific Independent Variables 
Table 11 provides a summary measurement of country-specific independent variables and their expected sign in 
relation to leverage. The set of country-specific independent variables consists of the development of the banking 
industry, the development of the stock market, the development of the bond market, GDP growth rate and inflation 
rate.  
Country-specific factors Indicators Expected sign 
Development of 
Banking Industry (BANK) 
Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP (%), measured as claims on domestic real 
non-financial sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP 
+ 
Development of Stock 
Market (STOCK) 
Stock market capitalization to GDP (%), measured as the total value of listed 
shares to GDP 
- 
Development of Bond 
Market (BOND) 
Sum of private bond market and public bond market capitalization to GDP +/- 
GDP Growth Rate 
(GDPGROWTH) 
Annual real GDP growth rate +/- 
Inflation (INFLATION) 
Annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator shows the rate of price 
change in the economy as a whole 
+/- 
 
 
4.4 Hypothesis 
In the previous sections, the relationship between two sets of firm-specific and country-
specific factors and the leverage ratio has been discussed from both theoretical and practical 
points of view. In this paper, the following hypothesis will be tested and the empirical results 
will be further discussed: 
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4.4.1 Firm-specific Determinants Hypothesis  
H1.1: Tangibility is positively correlated with leverage. 
H1.2: Firm size is positively correlated with leverage. 
H1.3: Business risk is negatively correlated with leverage. 
H1.4: Non-debt tax shields is negatively correlated with leverage. 
H1.5: Growth opportunity is negatively correlated with leverage. 
H1.6: Profitability is negatively correlated with leverage. 
H1.7: Liquidity is negatively correlated with leverage.  
4.4.2 Country-specific Determinants Hypothesis 
H2.1: The development of the banking industry is positively correlated with leverage. 
H2.2: The development of the stock market is negatively correlated with leverage. 
H2.3: The development of the bond market is positively correlated with leverage. 
H2.4: GDP growth rate is negatively correlated with leverage. 
H2.5: Inflation is positively correlated with leverage. 
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5 Empirical Results 
While several of existing empirical studies have examined the effect of firm-specific and 
country-specific determinants on capital structure for public firms, most often these studies 
primarily focused on the U.S market and other common developed markets (Deesomsak et 
al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012). On the other hand, there is still very little 
empirical studies conducted in the Nordic market: even existing literature that included 
broader data set of these Nordic countries have found mixed results for the determinants of 
the capital structure in both firm-level and country-level aspects (De Jong et al., 2008). Thus, 
the aim of this paper is to extend the existing literature on this topic in the Nordic region by 
providing an empirical analysis of the impact of firm-specific and country-specific factors 
on the capital structure decisions using fixed-effect regression.  
In addition, this chapter also provides additional analysis on the impact industrial 
factors on the determinants of the capital structure for pubic firms by decomposing the 
pooled data set into sub-categories of different industries following the Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS). Furthermore, this paper also examines the effect of the 
financial crisis 2008 to the determinants of capital structure by decomposing the data set into 
pre-crisis (before 2008) and post-crisis (after 2008) period.  
5.1 The Determinants of Firm-Specific Factors on Leverage 
In order to identify the potential heteroscedasticity in the sample set, I employ the Breush-
Pagan test and the test result p-value for seven parameters is zero, which rejects the null 
hypothesis that there is no heteroscedasticity in the sample set. In addition, I conduct the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (or the so-called Hausman specification test) to differentiate fixed 
effect and random effect model. The p-value result of the Hausman specification test is zero, 
which also rejects the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between firms’ non-
observable individual effects and the independent variables. Thus, the fixed effect model is 
preferred at any conventional significance level.  
Table 12 below provides a summary of estimation results using fixed effect model for 
the pooled sample set, as well as regression results for individual country in the Nordic 
region. 
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Table 12: Summary of Regression Estimation using Fixed Effect model  
Table 12 provides a summary of estimation results using fixed effect model for the following regression:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 , 
whereas LEV is the long-term debt  ratio, TANG is the tangibility, SIZE is the firm size, NDTS is the non-
debt tax shields, RISK is the business risk, GROWTH is the growth opportunity, PROFIT is the profitability, 
LIQ is the liquidity. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Variables Pooled Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
TANG 0.114*** 0.253*** 0.009 0.103*** 0.087*** 
 (0.012) (0.045) (0.042) (0.031) (0.015) 
SIZE 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.002 0.035*** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.011) (0.008) (0.005) (0.003) 
NDTS -0.031** 0.369 -0.098 0.059 -0.032*** 
 (0.011) (0.247) (0.125) (0.064) (0.010) 
LIQ -0.001 0.001 -0.005** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH 0.001 0.016** -0.012* 0.002* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
PROFIT -0.030*** -0.071* -0.267*** -0.047*** -0.019*** 
 (0.006) (0.036) (0.041) (0.013) (0.006) 
RISK -0.000** 0.000 0.000 -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.230*** -0.587*** 0.157 -0.518*** -0.078 
 (0.046) (0.202) (0.156) (0.103) (0.055) 
Observations 5,744 668 1,059 1,453 2,564 
R-squared 0.271 0.102 0.058 0.057 0.027 
 
 
5.1.1 Tangibility (TANG) 
Tangibility is expected to have a positive correlation with leverage ratio for public firms. 
The result of the fixed effect model shows that Tangibility is positively related to long-term 
debt ratio for all countries in the sample set except for Finland. More interestingly, this 
positive relationship is statistically significant even at 1% significant level. The result is 
consistent with the static trade-off theory that public firms with higher tangibility level are 
more likely to use more leverage because of lower costs of debt; meanwhile, the insignificant 
result of tangibility for the case of Finnish listed firms is probably due to the close 
relationship of Finnish public firms and lenders, which reduces demand for required 
collateral for debt financing.  
For the case of Sweden, although they have a higher portion of public firms operating 
in Information Technology industry in comparison to other Nordic countries, the result 
shows that there is still a significant positive relationship between tangibility and leverage 
for public firms in Sweden. One explanation could be that the portion of Swedish listed firms 
operating in Industrial industry is also very high, in which these firms are more likely to use 
their tangible assets as collateral to diminish the costs of debt. The positive correlation 
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between tangibility and leverage is consistent with previous empirical studies (Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; De Jong et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2012). 
5.1.2 Firm Size (SIZE) 
Firm size is expected to have a significant positive relation with leverage ratio for public 
firms following the empirical results of existing studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2008). The result of the fixed effect model shows 
that firm size is positively correlated to long-term debt ratio for all countries, except for 
Finland, although the pooled data set also yields a positive relationship for the two variables. 
This positive correlation is consistent with the static trade-off theory and information 
asymmetries, in which large public firms tend to be more diversified and thus they have a 
lower probability of bankruptcy and financial distress. On the other hand, smaller firms are 
more likely to face a higher cost for obtaining debt financing. The positive correlation is also 
consistent with previous empirical studies (Titman et al., 1988; Wald, 1999). 
5.1.3 Business Risk (RISK) 
As discussed in the previous sections, the business risk is expected to have a negative 
relationship with leverage ratio for public firms. The result of the fixed effect model shows 
that earnings volatility is negatively correlated to leverage ratio for the pooled data set and 
for Norway and Sweden. There is no significant relationship between the two variables for 
Finland and Denmark. Theoretically, the static trade-off theory and bankruptcy costs 
suggested that public firms with volatile earnings have higher probability of bankruptcy and 
financial distress, as these firms may not be able to fulfil their debt commitments. Therefore, 
a high volatility in earnings reduces firms’ capacity for debt financing and the business risk 
is expected to be negatively correlated with leverage.  
In practice, prior literature showed mixed results for the relationship between leverage 
ratio and the business risk: earnings volatility appears to have no significant effect on 
leverage in all four Asian countries in the sample, including Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Australia (Deesomsak et al., 2004); on the other hand, leverage ratio is positively 
correlated with the business risk in Jordan, and vice versa in Korea (Booth et al., 2001). One 
of the reasons for the positive relationship found in previous studies could be because firms’ 
capacity to service their debt obligation is far beyond their current borrowing level; thus, 
these firms may ignore the volatility of earnings because of the low risk of financial distress. 
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Booth et al. (2001) also found a positive correlation in Jordan, while Deesomsak et al. (2004) 
found a similar result in Australia. 
5.1.4 Growth Opportunity (GROWTH) 
Theoretically, growth opportunity is expected to have a negative relationship with leverage 
ratio, as public firms with higher growth are more likely to prefer equity financing to debt 
financing due to agency conflicts. However, in practice, the result of the fixed effect model 
shows that Finland is the only country which has a significant inverse correlation between 
growth opportunity and long-term debt ratio, while there is a positive correlation for 
Denmark and there is no significant relationship for Sweden and Norway. The negative 
relationship for public firms in Finland is consistent with the static trade-off theory and 
agency theory, in which firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to use internal 
sources of finance or equity to finance their investment projects instead of seeking external 
debt to avoid agency conflicts (Wald, 1999). Prior empirical studies also found a significant 
negative relationship between growth opportunity and leverage ratio (Wald, 1999; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004; De Jong et al., 2008). 
5.1.5 Profitability (PROFIT) 
Theoretically, profitability is expected to have a positive relationship with leverage ratio for 
public firms. However, the result of the fixed effect model shows the inverse correlation 
between the profitability and long-term debt ratio for all four countries. This result rejects 
the static trade-off theory and supports the pecking order theory and information 
asymmetries, in which firms in Nordic region generally prefer to finance their investment 
from retained earnings and debts to equity. To some extent, this result also indicates that the 
effect of the static trade-off theory is weaker than the effect of the pecking order theory and 
information asymmetries. Prior empirical studies also found a significant negative 
relationship between profitability and leverage (Booth et al., 2001; Deesomsak et al., 2004; 
Huang, 2006). 
5.1.6 Non-debt Tax Shields (NDTS) 
Theoretically, non-debt tax shields is expected to have a negative relationship with leverage 
ratio, as public firms with greater non-debt tax deductions are less likely to choose debt for 
their external financing, because they have less incentives for the tax deducted benefits 
provided by debt. While prior empirical studies found an inverse correlation (DeAngelo and 
Masulis, 1980; Wald, 1999; Deesomsak et al., 2004), the result of the fixed effect model 
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shows no significant correlation between non-debt tax shields and long-term debt ratio for 
most of Nordic countries, except in Sweden and in the pooled data set there is a negative 
correlation between the two variables. This result indicates that the effect from the point of 
view of the static trade-off theory may be not strong enough for the non-debt tax shields to 
have a significant impacts on firms’ decision on capital structure in the Nordic region, with 
Sweden is the only exception. 
5.1.7 Liquidity (LIQ) 
Theoretically, liquidity is expected to have a negative relationship with leverage ratio, as 
public firms with high liquidity have less incentives to borrow compared to public firms with 
low liquidity, because these firms could utilize their liquid assets for future investment 
opportunities as a trusted financial source. While existing literature found a negative 
correlation (Deesomsak et al., 2004; Eriotis et al., 2007), the result of the fixed effect model 
shows no significant estimation for most of Nordic countries, except for Finland. This result 
indicates that neither the effect of pecking order theory nor the effect of static trade-off 
theory is strong enough for liquidity to have impact on capital structure decision, or it may 
because these two effects cancel out each other. 
5.1.8 Industry Effect on Firm-specific Determinants  
Table 13 below provides a summary of estimation results using fixed effect regression model 
for public firms in the Nordic region classified under different industrial sectors, following 
GICS code. As it can be seen from the figures, there is no significant correlation between 
tangibility and leverage ratio for public firms operating in Information Technology sector, 
which indicates the aforementioned suggestion that firms operating in a less tangible-
intensive industry may behave differently from the pecking order theory, as these firms 
prefer equity issue if they need external financing.  
In addition, non-debt tax shields is also positively correlated with leverage for 
Consumer Staples, Real Estate and Utilities sector, while it yields a significant negative 
association for Energy and Material sector. This result strongly indicates the existence of 
industrial factor across listed firms in the Nordic region. Prior empirical studies also found 
the significant effect of industrial factor on the capital structure decision (Huang, 2006; De 
Jong et al., 2008).
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Table 13: Model Estimation using Fixed Effect model with Industrial Classification 
Table 13 provides a summary of estimation results using fixed effect model for the following regression:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡, whereas LEV is the long-term debt  ratio, TANG is the tangibility, SIZE is the 
firm size, NDTS is the non-debt tax shields, RISK is the business risk, GROWTH is the growth opportunity, PROFIT is the profitability, LIQ is the liquidity. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Variables 
Communication 
Services 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Consumer 
Staples 
Energy Healthcare Industrials 
Information 
Technology 
Materials Real Estate Utilities 
TANG 0.198*** 0.116** -0.086 0.096* 0.099*** 0.113*** -0.011 0.112** 0.166*** -0.012 
 (0.047) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.055) (0.054) (0.075) 
SIZE 0.013 0.029*** 0.001 0.052*** -0.006 0.027*** 0.010** -0.021* 0.062*** 0.046** 
 (0.009) (0.008 (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) 
NDTS 0.008 0.043 1.201*** -0.213* 0.021 -0.032 0.098 -0.046*** 0.700** 2.196*** 
 (0.056) (0.204) (0.119) (0.121) (0.060) (0.073) (0.075) (0.013) (0.346) (0.764) 
LIQ 0.007* 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
GROWTH 0.003 -0.001 0.008* 0.002 -0.008** 0.007* 0.006 -0.005** 0.015* -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.006) 
PROFIT -0.055 -0.016 0.049 -0.084** 0.055*** -0.067*** -0.042*** 0.021 0.114 0.067 
 (0.039) (0.019) (0.036) (0.039) (0.021) (0.016) (0.011) (0.046) (0.128) (0.152) 
RISK -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001* -0.002 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) 
Constant -0.197 -0.438*** 0.144 -0.814*** 0.158 -0.377*** -0.110 0.509** -0.981*** -0.746* 
 (0.167) (0.166) (0.204) (0.188) (0.119) (0.099) (0.086) (0.227) (0.286) (0.392) 
Observations 393 492 336 558 590 1,643 1,012 423 215 82 
R-squared 0.059 0.033 0.299 0.090 0.063 0.043 0.022 0.071 0.225 0.218 
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5.2 The Determinants of Country-Specific Factors on Leverage 
Table 14 provides the estimation results using pooled OLS model with country dummy 
variables for public listed firms in Nordic region to examine the effect of country-specific 
factors on capital structure decision. Besides firm-specific variables, additional country-
specific variables included in the OLS model consists of the development of the banking 
industry (BANK), the development of the stock market (STOCK), the development of the 
bond market (BOND), GDP growth rate (GDPGROWTH) and inflation rate (INFLATION).  
The development of the stock market is expected to have an inverse relationship with 
long-term debt ratio. The result of the OLS model also shows the significant negative 
correlation between the stock market development and leverage ratio for public firms in the 
Nordic region. This result could be explained by the fact that as the stock market becomes 
more developed, it also becomes larger in market value, trading volume, and liquidity. 
Moreover, public firms in countries with developed stock market will have more incentives 
to issue equities instead of debt financing. Therefore, the development of the stock market 
is more likely to have a significant influence on the capital structure choice of public firms. 
This result is also consistent with the findings in previous studies (Booth et al., 2001; 
Deesomsak et al., 2004). 
GDP growth rate is expected to have a mixed relationship with long-term debt ratio for 
public firms. The result of the OLS model, however, shows a significant inverse correlation 
between the GDP growth rate and leverage ratio. As discussed earlier, for firms operating in 
high GDP growth rate environment, they may find less incentives to adopt a large amount 
of external financing because of large economy-wide opportunities, thus they tend to adopt 
a lower level of leverage and lead to a negative relationship between these two variables. 
Although this result contradicts with Booth et al. (2001), the difference in result might be 
because Booth et al. examined these impacts by using a totally different set of developing 
countries. On the other hand, the positive relationship between GDP growth rate and 
leverage ratio is also found in some of the prior empirical studies (Gajurel, 2005).  
Similar to the GDP growth rate, inflation rate is also expected to have a mixed effect 
on leverage. However, the result of the OLS model shows that there is no significant 
relationship between the inflation rate and long-term debt ratio for public firms in the Nordic 
region. As discussed earlier, high inflation rate makes the cost of debt financing become 
lower, thus the demand for debt financing increases in relation to the increase in inflation 
rate. However, high inflation rate also discourage lenders to provide long-term debt to public 
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firms as debt contracts are generally fixed in nominal terms and the high inflation rate would 
make these lenders become worse-off. One of the reasons for this result is may be because 
these two effects from the lenders and the borrowers have canceled out each other. 
Table 14: Model Estimation using OLS model with Country-Specific Factors  
Table 14 provides the estimation results using OLS model for the following regression:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽8𝐵𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽13𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽14𝑁𝑂𝑅𝑊𝐴𝑌𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑆𝑊𝐸𝐷𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 , whereas LEV is the long-term debt  ratio, TANG is the 
tangibility, SIZE is the firm size, NDTS is the non-debt tax shields, RISK is the business risk, GROWTH is 
the growth opportunity, PROFIT is the profitability, LIQ is the liquidity, BANK is the bank development, 
STOCK is the development of the stock market, BOND is the development of the bond market, 
GDPGROWTH is the GDP growth rate, INFLATION is the inflation rate, whereas FINLANDDUM, 
NORWAYDUM, SWEDENDUM are country dummies. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** p < 
0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Variables LEV 
TANG 0.265*** 
 (0.010) 
SIZE 0.018*** 
 (0.001) 
NDTS -0.069** 
 (0.034) 
LIQ -0.003*** 
 (0.000) 
GROWTH -0.000 
 (0.001) 
PROFIT -0.022* 
 (0.009) 
RISK 0.0000 
 (0.000) 
BANK -0.047 
 (0.031) 
STOCK -0.0128*** 
 (0.0139) 
BOND 0.0267 
 (0.025) 
GDPGROWTH -0.334** 
 (0.124) 
INFLATION 0.304 
 (0.270) 
FINLANDDUM 0.0770*** 
 (0.0264) 
NORWAYDUM 0.0863*** 
 (0.0269) 
SWEDENDUM 0.0663*** 
 (0.0222) 
Constant -0.260*** 
 (0.056) 
Observations 3,450 
R-squared 0.324 
 
  
More importantly, the result of the OLS model shows that the development of the 
banking industry and the development of the bond market have no significant impact on the 
capital structure decision for public firms in the Nordic region. While theories suggest that 
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the development of the bond market should lead to an increase in the leverage ratio, this 
result indicates that changes in bond market have little impact on the capital structure choice 
for public firms in the Nordic region and instead these firms rely more on other financial 
options such as corporate bonds and bank loans. 
On the other hand, the insignificant correlation between the development of the 
banking industry and leverage also indicates that between corporate bonds and bank loans, 
public firms may prefer corporate bonds to bank loans. Furthermore, the result of the country 
dummy variables indicate that country-specific factors have an impact on long-term debt 
ratio as the results for all three dummy variables are significant at 1% significance level. 
5.3 Robustness Test  
In this section, I will test the effect of financial crisis in 2008 on firm-specific determinants 
of capital structure for public firms in the Nordic region. In order to test the effect, I further 
divide the pooled data set into two sub-samples: before- and after-crisis. Table 15 below 
provides a summary of estimation results for these two sub-samples using fixed effect 
regression. As it can be seen from the table, the impacts of firm-specific determinants on the 
capital structure are different between pre-crisis and post-crisis period. Tangibility and firm 
size have a significant positive relationship with long-term debt ratio, regardless whether in 
pre-crisis or post-crisis period. More surprisingly, there is no impact of financial crisis on 
liquidity for public firms in the Nordic region on leverage ratio, as the result shows no 
significant correlation between liquidity and long-term debt ratio.  
For other firm-specific determinants, the result clearly indicates the existence of the 
impact of financial crisis on the effects of determinants on capital structure for public firms 
in the Nordic region. Non-debt tax shields have a significant negative relationship with the 
leverage ratio after the financial crisis, although before the crisis there is no significant 
correlation between the two variables. On the other hand, growth opportunity have a 
significant positive relationship with the leverage ratio before the financial crisis; however, 
after the crisis, growth opportunity shows insignificant correlation with the long-term debt 
ratio.
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Table 15: Model Estimation using Fixed Effect model Before and After Financial Crisis 
Table 15 provides a summary of estimation results using fixed effect model for two sub-samples, before- and after- financial crisis 2008, for the following regression:  
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑇𝐴𝑁𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑁𝐷𝑇𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡, whereas LEV is the long-term debt  ratio, TANG is the tangibility, SIZE is the 
firm size, NDTS is the non-debt tax shields, RISK is the business risk, GROWTH is the growth opportunity, PROFIT is the profitability, LIQ is the liquidity. Standard errors are shown 
in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1  
Variables Pooled pre-crisis 
Denmark pre-
crisis 
Finland pre-
crisis 
Norway pre-
crisis 
Sweden pre-
crisis 
Pooled post-
crisis 
Denmark post-
crisis 
Finland post-
crisis 
Norway post-
crisis 
Sweden post-
crisis 
TANG 0.150*** 0.191 0.236* 0.023 0.151*** 0.091*** 0.293*** -0.066 0.062 0.073*** 
 (0.034) (0.116) (0.133) (0.071) (0.042) (0.014) (0.048) (0.047) (0.038) (0.016) 
SIZE 0.013** 0.017 0.028 0.016 -0.005 0.024*** 0.038*** -0.000 0.041*** 0.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.026) (0.021) (0.011) (0.008) (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) 
NDTS -0.001 1.647*** 1.047 0.424** -0.045 -0.028** 0.520* -0.135 0.020 -0.025** 
 (0.045) (0.476) (0.657) (0.164) (0.042) (0.011) (0.307) (0.128) (0.074) (0.010) 
LIQ -0.000 0.010 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.011** 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
GROWTH 0.002** 0.037*** 0.0158 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.036* -0.025*** -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.012) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.019) (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) 
PROFIT -0.024 -0.010 -0.170 0.064 0.001 -0.029*** -0.084** -0.155*** -0.051*** -0.019*** 
 (0.023) (0.104) (0.114) (0.045) (0.029) (0.005) (0.037) (0.049) (0.014) (0.006) 
RISK -0.000*** -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.147 -0.339 -0.500 -0.128 0.142 -0.342*** -0.709*** 0.221 -0.620*** -0.197*** 
 (0.115) (0.516) (0.418) (0.221) (0.144) (0.060) (0.267) (0.203) (0.134) (0.074) 
Observations 1,226 138 274 346 468 4,518 530 785 1,107 2,096 
R-squared 0.056 0.370 0.093 0.062 0.114 0.029 0.140 0.044 0.048 0.023 
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6 Conclusions 
The lack of comparative studies on capital structure decision and the dynamic economic and 
financial environment of Nordic countries are my main motivation for choosing this topic 
for my master’s thesis. Even existing empirical studies most often yield mixed results for 
the relationship of both firm-specific and country-specific determinants on the capital 
structure in different regions, thus it is very important to examine these effects more closely 
in the Nordic region as public firms operating in different areas are more likely to behave 
differently and even in a very unique way. 
This paper examines the effect of firm-specific and country-specific determinants on 
the capital structure choice of firms in four Nordic countries including Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden by providing three empirical studies examining different effects on 
capital structure. The first empirical study aimed to investigate the impact of firm-specific 
factors on the capital structure decision using fixed effect model. The second empirical study 
aimed to provide evidence on the role of industry effect on the capital structure decision 
using fixed effect model. The last empirical study aimed to provide evidence on the role of 
macroeconomic factors on leverage using OLS model. Furthermore, the effect of financial 
crisis in 2008 on firm-specific determinants of capital structure is examined in the robustness 
test using fixed effect model. In summary, the results support findings from existing 
empirical studies, even though there are some minor differences in the results of different 
countries or different industries, indicate the existence of both industrial effect and country 
effect. 
The result of the investigation into firm-specific effects shows that tangibility and firm 
size have a significant positive relationship with long-term debt ratio for public firms in most 
of Nordic countries, except for Finland. On the other hand, profitability is negatively 
correlated with leverage ratio in all four countries; meanwhile, growth opportunity yields a 
mixed result: there is a significant negative relationship for Finnish public firms and a 
significant positive relationship for Danish public firms. Liquidity and Non-debt tax shields 
have no significant impact on leverage for most of Nordic countries, except for Finland in 
terms of liquidity and Sweden in terms of non-debt tax shields. Business risk shows a 
significant negative relationship with leverage ratio in Norway and Sweden. Moreover, by 
decomposing the sample set into different industrial categories, I find that there is evidence 
Conclusions 46  
 
 
for the existence of industrial effect on firm-specific determinants, as the impact of those 
determinants on leverage ratio is different in different sectors.   
The result of the investigation into country-specific effects shows that GDP growth 
rate and the development of the stock market have a significant negative correlation with 
long-term debt ratio. On the other hand, the estimation results show that the development of 
the banking industry, the development of the bond market, and the inflation rate have no 
significant impact on capital structure decision for public firms in the Nordic region. These 
results may imply that Nordic firms in general prefer equity financing to debt financing, and 
when it comes to debt financing decision these firms prefer corporate bonds to bank loans.  
This paper has provided new evidence on the effect of some firm-specific and country-
specific determinants on the capital structure choice of firms in Nordic countries and thus 
helped to extend the empirical findings of existing studies on this topic. However, there are 
still some limitations to this paper.    
The first limitation is that the proximity in geographical location as well as the 
similarity in macroeconomic factors lead to the exclusion of commonly adopted independent 
variables such as corruption and legal system dummy variable. These exclusions may lead 
to a significant difference in the relationship of independent variables in comparison to prior 
existing literature.  
The second limitation is that this study from the beginning has excluded financial firms 
from the final sample set as I find that these financial firms have a distinct capital structure 
behavior due to their liquidity characteristic. This exclusion may yield a different estimation 
result in comparison to the sample set which fully includes financial firms. However, for 
these financial firms, separate analysis should be conducted and afterward compared to firms 
operating in other sector to gain a more thorough understanding of the determinants of 
capital structure.   
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